We propose and analyze semidefinite relaxation based locational marginal prices (RLMPs) for real and reactive power in electricity markets. Our analysis reveals that when the nonconvex economic dispatch problem has zero duality gap, the RLMPs exhibit properties similar to locational marginal prices with linearized power flow equations. Otherwise, they behave similar to convex hull prices. Restricted to radial distribution networks, RLMPs reduce to second-order cone relaxation based distribution locational marginal prices. We illustrate our theoretical results on numerical examples.
Introduction
Organized wholesale electricity markets rely on a bid and offer based security-constrained economic dispatch problem to compute dispatch and pricing decisions. Optimal dual multipliers of system constraints in the market clearing problem serve to define electricity prices. These locational marginal prices (LMPs), proposed by Bohn et al. (1984) , reflect marginal system costs to meet local incremental demand requirements.
LMPs stand on sound economic principles when the market clearing problem is convex. Derived with lossless linearized power flow models, e.g., using the so-called DC approximations presented in Stott et al. (2009) , LMPs exhibit several desirable properties. For example, they adequately incentivize market participants to follow the dispatch prescribed by the system operator (SO). Moreover, the SO never runs cash-negative after settling the payments with the market participants. See Wu et al. (1996) and Hogan (1992) for proofs and insightful discussions on LMPs.
Power flow equations in their full generality render the market clearing problem nonconvex. Linearized (real) power flow models often ignore losses and reactive power considerations. Hence, the market mechanism does not fully reflect the physics of the underlying power grid. Ad hoc measures to incorporate losses can distort price signals, e.g., see Litvinov (2010) for insightful discussions. Furthermore, ignoring reactive power transactions in the competitive market requires the SOs to acquire these services out of market through cost-based compensations. Payouts for such services can be high, e.g., PJM paid $342 million in 2018 according to Monitoring Analytics (2019) . To accurately model the power flow equations in market clearing procedures, we propose and analyze convex relaxation based locational marginal prices (RLMPs) for electricity in this paper. More precisely, we advocate to solve an economic dispatch problem with AC power flow equations to compute the dispatch, and set prices from optimal dual multipliers of its semidefinite relaxation.
Semidefinite programming (SDP) based convex relaxation of economic dispatch problems has its origins in Bai et al. (2008) and was popularized by Lavaei and Low (2012) . A considerable literature on the same has evolved since. To name a few, the works by Bose et al. (2015a) , Zhang and Tse (2013) and Lesieutre et al. (2011) study when such relaxations are exact, i.e., when the SDP relaxation provides an optimal solution of the nonconvex economic dispatch problem. Others such as Bose et al. (2015b) , Madani et al. (2014) and Zhang and Lavaei (2018) study efficient computational techniques to solve the relaxation at scale for practical power system examples. In contrast, we focus on prices derived from the SDP relaxation in this work and study its properties.
Our analysis reveals that RLMPs mimic the properties of LMPs when the relaxation is exact. Specifically, they incentivize market participants to follow the SO prescribed dispatch and the SO remains solvent after settling payments with the participants (under additional conditions). When the relaxation is not exact, RLMPs minimize a specific form of side-payments that SOs must pay the market participants to incentivize them to follow SO's dispatch signal. In fact, the properties resemble that of convex hull prices (CHPs) proposed and analyzed by Gribik et al. (2007) and Schiro et al. (2016) . CHPs tackle nonconvexity in market clearing problems that arise due to commitment decisions and no-load cost considerations. RLMPs instead handle the nonconvexity that arises due to power flow equations.
The SDP based pricing problem restricted to radial (acyclic) distribution networks can be solved as a second-order cone program (SOCP). We establish that our proposed RLMPs coincide with the SOCP-based distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs) proposed in Papavasiliou (2018) . Rapid proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in low and medium voltage distribution grids has generated considerable interest in designing appropriate price signals for distribution networks, e.g., see Ntakou and Caramanis (2014) , Yuan et al. (2018) , Caramanis et al. (2016) and Sotkiewicz and Vignolo (2006) . Distribution grids typically have lines with relatively high resistance to reactance ratios. Also, reactive power transactions play a crucial role in maintaining voltage magnitudes within tight bounds. DLMPs computed from SOCP or SDP relaxations accurately reflect the physics of the grid. Our results justify the use of SOCP-based DLMPs from an economic standpoint.
The Market Clearing Procedure
Consider a bid-based economic dispatch problem that a SO can utilize to clear the market. In this work, we compute the dispatch and the prices from two separate problems. To describe the market clearing process, we first describe the model for the power grid and the grid-tied assets.
Modeling the Grid
Consider an electric power network on n buses and m transmission lines. Let V ∈ C n denote the vector of nodal voltage phasors, where C is the set of complex numbers. Denote by y k the admittance of the line joining buses k and .
The current flowing from bus k towards an adjacent bus is given by (V k − V )y k , yielding
as the apparent power flow from bus k to bus . The notation u H stands for the conjugate transpose of u and i := √ −1. More succinctly, the above relation can be written as
where Φ k and Ψ k are n × n Hermitian matrices with all zeros except the following entries
The two summands in the right-hand-side (RHS) of (2) define the real and reactive power flows from bus k to bus , respectively. Assume that the real power flows on the lines are constrained as
for a flow limit f k > 0. Such limits typically arise from thermal considerations, but may also serve as proxies for stability constraints. Assume that y kk is the shunt admittance at bus k. Then, the apparent power injection at bus k becomes
and 1 k ∈ C n is the vector of all zeros, except the k-th entry that is unity. The notation ∼ k indicates that a transmission line connects buses and k in the power network. Voltage magnitudes across the network are deemed to remain close to rated voltage levels. We model such constraints at each bus k as
Modeling Grid Connected Assets
Consider two assets connected at each bus -an uncontrollable asset whose apparent power draw is fixed and known and a controllable asset whose power injection can vary within known capacity limits. Let p D k and q D k , respectively, denote the nominal real and reactive power draws at bus k from the uncontrollable asset. Similarly, let p G k and q G k denote the real and reactive power generation at bus k, respectively, that vary within known capacity limits as
Associated with that generation is a convex dispatch cost c k (p G k , q G k ). Assume henceforth that c k is jointly convex in its arguments. Such costs in wholesale markets are inferred from supply offers and demand bids. Uncontrollable assets represent the collective inelastic power demands at a bus. Generators and proxy demand resources comprise controllable assets. There may be one, more than one, or no controllable and uncontrollable assets at each bus, but we assume one asset of each kind to simplify notation.
Market Clearing Problem with AC Power Flow Equations
The SO seeks to compute a dispatch that minimizes the aggregate dispatch costs from the collection of grid-connected controllable assets and meets the power requirements of the uncontrollable ones, meeting the engineering constraints of the power network as follows.
for k = 1, . . . , n, ∼ k over the variables p G , q G , p, q, and V . The boldfaced symbols collect the corresponding variables across the network. In P AC , (5a) and (5b) enforce the power balance at each bus, (5c) limits the power flows over each transmission line, (5d) defines capacity limits for the power production from dispatchable assets, and finally, (5e) defines bounds on voltage magnitudes. The above market clearing problem is an instance of an optimal power flow (OPF) problem with the so-called AC power flow equations. P AC is a nonconvex nonlinear optimization problem owing to quadratic equalities. Indeed, a long literature has studied computational methods to solve P AC optimally for all problem instances. See Cain et al. (2012) for a survey. Since our focus is pricing, we sidestep the computational issues and assume henceforth that an optimal solution of P AC is available. In the next section, we ask: how should we price such a dispatch?
Relaxation-based Locational Marginal Prices
We associate nodal prices to real and reactive powers based on a semidefinite programming (SDP) based convex relaxation of P AC in P SDP in (6) that seeks to optimize the same objective function as P AC , but over a convex superset of the feasible set of P AC . To arrive at the relaxation, notice that
for any M ∈ C n×n and W = V V H . Here, Tr stands for the trace operator. The above representation reduces quadratic forms in V to linear forms in W ∈ C n×n . Also, any W that admits the representation W = V V H is a rank-1 positive semidefinite matrix (henceforth denoted W 0). Therefore, one can reformulate P AC by replacing all quadratic forms in V by linear expressions in W and enforce W to be a rank-1 positive semidefinite matrix. This reformulation encodes the nonconvexity of P AC in the rank constraint. Drop this constraint to arrive at the following SDP relaxation of P AC :
for k = 1, . . . , n, ∼ k over the variables W , p G , q G , p, and q. For any variable z in P SDP , we use the notation z * to denote z at an optimum. We now define prices using the optimal Lagrange multipliers from P SDP . The prices we advocate are locational in nature, i.e., they vary based on location within the power network. However, the prices are uniform across assets connected at the same bus. Towards that goal, associate the multipliers λ p k and λ q k to the real and reactive power balance constraints in (6a) and (6b), respectively. Similarly, associate µ k to the one in (6c). Assign µ p k , µ p k to the upper and lower limits, respectively, on the real power generation in (6d), and µ q k , µ q k to the respective limits on the reactive power generation in (6d). Define µ v k , µ v k , respectively, as the multipliers for the upper and lower bounds on voltage magnitudes in (6e). Finally, associate the matrix U ∈ C n×n as the multiplier for (6f).
Definition 1 (Relaxation-based Locational Marginal Prices (RLMP))
Define λ p, * k and λ q, * k , the optimal Lagrange multipliers from P SDP for the real and reactive power balance constraints at bus k, respectively, as the prices for real and reactive power at bus k.
The market proceeds as follows. The SO collects bids and offers from market participants and solves the market clearing problem P AC to compute the dispatch decisions p G, * and q G, * . Then, the SO solves P SDP and computes the optimal Lagrange multipliers λ p, * and λ q, * as the RLMPs. Under our pricing scheme, the controllable asset at bus k produces p G, * k and q G, * k and collects the payment π G k := λ p, * k ·p G, * k +λ q, * k ·q G, * k from the SO. Further, the uncontrollable asset with its demand p D k and q D k pays π D k := λ p, * k · p D k + λ q, * k · q D k to the SO. We devote the next section to the derivation of crucial properties of RLMPs that lend credence to this design.
Properties of RLMPs
What justifies RLMPs for price formation in electricity markets? We describe a wishlist of properties for market mechanisms in Section 4.1 and argue through our main result in Theorem 1 in Section 4.2 that RLMPs exhibit a number of these desirable properties, thus providing the rationale behind our proposed mechanism.
Desirable Qualities of Market Mechanisms

Efficient Market Equilibrium
The dispatch is said to be efficient and clears the market, if it optimally solves P AC . It is individually rational, if the SO prescribed dispatch indeed maximizes the profit of a controllable asset, given the prices. Said mathematically, the dispatch p G, * k , q G, * k must solve
given λ p, * k , λ q, * k . A controllable asset then has no incentive to deviate from its prescribed dispatch, given the prices. A pricing scheme is nodally uniform if all assets connected at a bus pay or are paid at the same price. Thus, co-located assets do not have incentives to trade amongst themselves. A market mechanism supports an efficient market equilibrium if the dispatch is efficient, clears the market, and is individually rational, given nodally uniform prices.
Revenue Adequacy
A market mechanism is revenue adequate if the rents collected from power sales are enough to cover the rents payable to suppliers, i.e., the merchandising surplus defined as
Main Result
Having described the qualities we seek in a market mechanism, we now characterize the properties of RLMPs in Theorem 1. The proof relies on duality theory of semidefinite programming and is relegated to Section A. Assume throughout that P SDP satisfies Slater's condition. To present the result, we need the following definition.
for µ ≥ 0, µ v ≥ 0, µ v ≥ 0, U 0 as the product revenue shortfall, where V * constitutes an optimal solution of P AC .
Theorem 1 P SDP is the dual of the dual problem of P AC , and the duality gap of P AC is given by
When the duality gap is zero (rank W * = 1 in P SDP ), then the proposed market mechanism supports an efficient market equilibrium. Moreover, if the voltage lower limit constraint is non-binding at all buses, i.e.,
for k = 1, . . . , n, then the mechanism is revenue adequate.
Theorem 1 reveals that when the duality gap is nonzero, RLMPs seek to minimize the sum of two terms that are individually nonnegative-the lost opportunity cost (LOC) and the product revenue shortfall (PRS). Having LOC as a component implies that RLMPs in a way attempt to minimize side payments necessary to incentivize controllable assets to follow the SO's dispatch signals, thereby increasing market transparency. The duality gap of RLMPs is reminiscent of that of convex hull prices (CHPs). See Schiro et al. (2016) , Gribik et al. (2007) for comparison. We remark that the economic interpretation of PRS remains challenging -a feature common to RLMPs and CHP.
When the duality gap is zero, Theorem 1 establishes that RLMPs have similar properties as LMPs. No controllable asset has incentive to deviate from the dispatch described by the optimal solution of P AC . Under the additional condition of non-binding lower bounds for voltage constraints at each bus, the payments from uncontrollable assets cover the rents of those that are controllable. Given the strong coupling between reactive power injection and voltage magnitudes, one expects nonnegative MS with adequate reactive power support. Our numerical experiments in Section 6 illustrate that non-binding lower voltage constraints are sufficient but not necessary for revenue adequacy.
SDPs scale poorly with problem dimension. Sparsity patterns of the coefficient matrices in P SDP follow that of the underlying power network, and consequently, powerful decompositions techniques from sparse semidefinite programming apply to P SDP . Decompositions based on chordal extensions of the power network graph substantially reduce computational burden, e.g., see Kalbat and Lavaei (2016) , Madani et al. (2014) , Bose et al. (2015b) and Zhang and Lavaei (2018) .
Application to Distribution Locational Marginal Prices
Rapid proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs) and the aim to harness demand flexibility of end-use customers have motivated research in defining appropriate price signals for compensating energy transactions in distribution networks. e.g., see Ntakou and Caramanis (2014) , Papavasiliou (2018) and Yuan et al. (2018) . Suggested distribution LMPs (DLMPs) aim to reflect the locational value of DERs as discussed in Li et al. (2014) and Huang et al. (2015) . We argue that RLMPs from P SDP become the second-order cone programming (SOCP) based DLMPs in Papavasiliou (2018) over radial (acyclic) distribution grids.
Throughout this section, assume that the power network is acyclic. Ignore shunt admittances for simplicity and include any capacitor banks as constant VAR sources. Associate with each edge (line) an arbitrary direction to represent the network as a directed graph. Denote by k → , a directed edge from bus k to bus , and by E, the set of all directed edges. Define 1 y k := r k + ix k as the impedance of line k → and consider the following SOCP problem.
for k ∈ N, k → ∈ E over the variables p G , q G , w, P , Q, J . All constraints in the above problem are linear except (12g) that is a second-order cone constraint. In fact, the inequality in (12g) replaced by an equality amounts to a reformulation of P AC . The inequality potentially expands the feasible set of P AC , making P SOCP a convex relaxation of P AC . When solved with an equality in (12g), the variables P k and Q k denote the sending-end real and reactive powers from bus k towards bus . Then, J k becomes the squared current magnitude on that line. Finally, w k equals the squared voltage magnitude at bus k. The SOCP based convex relaxation presented above utilizes the so-called branch flow model of Kirchhoff's laws over a distribution network, and has been extensively analyzed by Gan et al. (2015) , Li et al. (2012) and Farivar and Low (2013) .
Associate Lagrange multipliers Λ p k and Λ q k with (12a) and (12b), and their collections across the network as Λ p and Λ q , respectively. The following result establishes the equality between prices derived from P SDP and P SOCP . The proof is included in Section B.
Theorem 2 For a radial power network, the set of optimal Lagrange multipliers Λ p, * , Λ q, * of P SOCP equal the set of optimal Lagrange multipliers λ p, * , λ q, * of P SDP .
Said differently, RLMPs restricted to radial networks coincides with DLMPs proposed in Papavasiliou (2018) . We have modeled the distribution network as a single-phase equivalent of a balanced three-phase circuit. Extension of our work to consider multi-phase unbalanced distribution grids remains an interesting direction for future research.
Our exposition focuses on the mathematical foundations of DLMPs and sidesteps a range of issues surrounding the adoption of such prices in practice. For example, what is the right trading platform that needs to be established and what products should be traded in such platforms that DERs can participate in? How should such platforms coordinate their operations with wholesale markets governed by transmission system operators? See Gerard et al. (201) and Bose and Low (2018) for insightful discussions on the same. We align with the view in Caramanis et al. (2016) to consider a retail market operated by an independent distribution system operator (DSO) responsible for the dispatch and pricing of DERs, but leave the specifics of a coordinated wholesale-retail market design to a future effort.
Numerical Experiments
In this section, we report results from numerical experiments on different power network examples to illustrate the behavior of RLMPs as well as to discuss main insights from our theoretical results. In our first experiment, we compute the RLMPs on the IEEE 30-bus test system adopted from Matpower, developed by Zimmerman et al. (1997) . Reactive power demands are computed from the real power demands, assuming a lagging power factor of 0.9. The resulting RLMPs for real and reactive power across the network are illustrated through heatmaps in Figures 1a and 1b respectively. An increase in real and reactive power demands at buses 29 and 30 demonstrate the locational nature of these prices. In particular, once the real power demand on bus 30 exceeds the flow limit on branch 29-30, the prices for both real and reactive power at buses 29 and 30 significantly exceed those at other locations in the network, as Figures 1c and 1d reveal. In effect, these prices reflect that in the presence of congestion it becomes more expensive to supply demand at buses 29 and 30. We then narrow the voltage magnitude limits on a subset of nodes; the effect on RLMPs is illustrated in Figures 1e and 1f for real and reactive power prices, respectively. The impact is significantly larger on reactive power prices than on real power prices. Intuitively, maintaining the voltage level within acceptable bounds across the network requires sufficient injections of reactive power in the appropriate locations on the network. Thus, enforcing stricter voltage limits, increases demand for reactive power injections and therefore their RLMPs. See our work in Winnicki et al. (2019) for similar examples derived on a 15-bus distribution network adopted from Papavasiliou (2018) .
To offer further insights into the properties of RLMPs, we conduct a case study on a three-bus power network example for our second experiment. The network has generators and demands at each bus that are connected via three transmission lines with identical parameters f , r, x. Assume Table 1 records the parameters chosen for our experiments. In addition, we set p G k = q G k = 0 for all buses throughout. For the first three cases we consider, P SDP , solved via CVX in Matlab (see Grant et al. (2008) ), is exact with rank W * = 1. In our first experiment, the voltage lower limit at bus 3 binds, thus violating the sufficient condition in Theorem 1 for revenue adequacy, and we obtain MS < 0. Also, P SOCP for the same experiment yields an optimal objective function value of 30.93, that is strictly lower than 31.14 from that of P SDP . Thus, P SOCP is not exact. To solve P SOCP , we assume directed edges 2 → 1, 2 → 3, and 1 → 3 for the three-bus power network. Prices derived from P SOCP , together with the optimal dispatch, do not support an efficient market equilibrium, while RLMPs derived from P SDP do. In the second case we study, voltage lower limits do not bind at any bus. Indeed, we obtain a nonnegative MS, as Theorem 1 dictates. For the third case, the lower limit on voltage magnitude binds at bus 2. Yet, we obtain MS > 0, indicating that our criterion identified in Theorem 1 for revenue adequacy is sufficient but not necessary.
P SDP is not exact in the fourth case with rank W * = 2. We obtain p G, * = (0.97, 2.20, 0) , q G, * = (1.09, 1.20, 1.26) , λ p, * = (10.06, 1.58, 11.52) , λ q, * = (0, 0, 0) , where P AC is solved via Matpower. The solution of P AC is verified to be a local optimal solution; global optimality remains difficult to certify. Furthermore, we calculate π SO 2 (λ p, * 2 , λ q, * 2 ) = 0.79 and π opt 2 (λ p, * 2 , λ q, * 2 ) = 0.84. Thus, price at bus 2 for this case does not adequately incentivize the generator at that bus to follow the SO-prescribed dispatch. It needs a side-payment to do so. 
Conclusions and Future Directions
The non-linear, non-convex nature of the AC optimal power flow problem (P AC ) introduces challenges in defining appropriate price signals to compensate grid-connected assets in electricity markets. In this paper, we aim to address the question: what price signals are deemed meaningful for consumers and suppliers in power markets that support the dispatch solution resulting from P AC ? We propose prices for real and reactive power based on the SDP relaxation (P SDP ) of P AC referred to as relaxation-based locational marginal prices (RLMPs). Our market model relies on a central entity, the system operator, that determines the dispatch for all grid-connected assets from the solution of P AC while the compensation of each market participant is derived from the optimal Lagrange multipliers of P SDP . Our analysis demonstrates that when the SDP relaxation is exact, RLMPs support efficient market equilibria and the market remains revenue adequate -properties that are reminiscent of LMPs defined with linearized power flows. On the other hand, when the relaxation is not exact, RLMPs possess properties similar to convex hull prices and are shown to minimize a form of side-payments. Moreover, in acyclic power networks RLMPs become suitable price signals to compensate generation and demand resources connected to low and medium voltage distribution networks. We provide numerical experiments that illustrate the locational nature of RLMPs and their key properties.
There are several interesting directions for future research. First, we aim to extend RLMPs to three-phase, unbalanced distribution networks following Zhao et al. (2017) and then leverage our RLMP-based DLMPs within a systematic retail market framework that clearly defines the role of a DSO, the nature of offers and bids, the information exchanged with the transmission system operator, etc. Second, we hope to combine our analysis here on RLMPs with that of CHPs analyzed by Gribik et al. (2007) and Schiro et al. (2016) to account for nonconvexity in market clearing problems that arise due to power flow equations and integral commitment decisions. Finally, we intend to establish a general theory of pricing in nonconvex markets along the lines of Scarf (1994) to include nonconvexity due to physical constraints of an underlying network. Such an analysis has potential applications beyond electricity markets, e.g., for gas networks as in Zlotnik et al. (2019) • Primal feasibility conditions: (6a) -(6f).
• Dual feasibility: µ p, * k , µ p, * k , µ q, * k , µ q, * k , µ * k , µ v, * k , µ v, * k ≥ 0, for k = 1, . . . , n, k = 1, . . . , 2m, U * 0. • Gradient conditions: For k = 1, ..., n, (k ) = 1, ..., m:
• Complementary slackness conditions: For k = 1, ..., n, (k ) = 1, ..., m: A Proof of Theorem 1.
The proof proceeds in four steps. We first show that the dual program of P AC coincides with the dual of P SDP . Next, we compute the duality gap of P AC . We find that the duality gap constitutes of two terms: the LOC and PRS. When the relaxation is exact or equivalently when rank W * = 1, we show that prices defined as the Langrange of P SDP support an efficient market equilibrium. Moreover, when the voltage lower bound is inactive, revenue adequacy is of the SO is guaranteed.
Step 1. Proving that dual programs of P AC and P SDP coincide. Define the partial Lagrangian of P AC as
k and the set S as
Then, the dual program of P AC is given by
In the above problem, the inner minimization with respect to V amounts to minimizing V H U V , where
It equals −∞ unless U 0. Thus, (16) can be written as
A partial Lagrangian function for P SDP is given by
using which the dual program of P SDP can be written as
Solve the inner minimization over W , i.e., equate the partial derivative of L W with respect to W to zero to get (17). Incorporation of (17) as a constraint in (19) yields (18), proving that the dual programs of P AC and P SDP coincide.
Step 2. Computing the duality gap. Recall that (18) defines the common dual program of P AC and P SDP . With Slater's condition, strong duality holds for P SDP , and hence, the optimal cost of P SDP is the same as that of (18). Call this cost c * SDP .
Next, consider an optimal solution p G, * , q G, * , V * of P AC with an optimal cost c * AC = n k=1 c k p G, * k , q G, * k .
(20)
Then, the nodal demands satisfy
Utilizing (20) and (21), the objective function in (18) can be written as
that using the notation in (10) allows us to rearrange (18) as
where η is given by
It remains to show that η indeed equals PRS. To that end, utilize the definition of U in (17) to get
